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Abstract
Lenders often require of small investors that they sign a personal guarantee before
forwarding funds, and if the borrower’s own funds or assets are insufficient backing for
a guarantee, then a third party may be asked to sign. Since strangers do not guarantee
each other’s debts, it is in the nature of such guarantees that they straddle the private
and business worlds within any relationship. Important relationship assets (such as
the family home) are often at stake, and courts struggle with the policy tradeoffs
inherent in such deeds or contracts between ‘freedom of contract’ and a concern with
the potential for ‘coercion’ of the one signing. This paper explores the nature of
the optimal third party guarantee within the incomplete contracting environment
inaugurated by Grossman and Hart (1986). The optimal contract trades off the ex
post amount of relationship asset to be foreclosed by a bank against the desirability of
ensuring the ex ante release of funds to promote the exploitation of viable investment
opportunities. The role of ex post bargaining power, as a proxy for ‘coercion’ is
examined and it is found that for certain parameter values in the model increased
coercion, while freeing more funds ex ante, simultaneously lowers social welfare.
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1 The problem
It is well-known that the debt structure of the majority of small to medium sized businesses
is bank debt.1 Such businesses have limited access to capital markets and are much more
affected than larger firms by business cycle-related fluctuations.2 It is known that in the
event of financial distress banks rarely forgive principal.3 Empirically, the more bank debt
a company has, the more likely that asset sales will be forced upon it during bankruptcy.4
Banks rarely lend to small businesses without the comfort of guarantees or collateral.5 Even
when such businesses operate via a corporate form that legally provides limited liability
protection, banks generally insist on personal guarantees.6
This paper is concerned with the contractual phenomenon of third-party guarantees. If
for some reason (such as the business being a start-up) the person seeking a loan does not
possess business assets to act as collateral, a third party may be asked to act as guarantor
in their stead. Since strangers do not act as guarantors for each other’s debts, it is intrinsic
to such guarantees that they are signed within the context of a longer-term, continuing,
personal relationship. Concrete examples of people likely to be asked to act as a third-party
guarantee include wives guaranteeing the loans of husbands (and vice-versa), parents the
loans of children, grandparents the loans of grandchildren. A problem potentially arises
when the asset which acts as collateral is an important relationship asset like the family
home, which has a value to its occupants greater than the market value a foreclosing bank
might receive. Although it might be thought that guarantors worried about the future loss
of such an important relationship asset should then not sign a guarantee, such an approach
1See Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) and Petersen and Rajan (1994) for details and evidence.
2See Gertler and Gilchrist (1994).
3See Glassman and Struck (1982).
4See Dennis, Dunkelberg and van Hulle (1988).
5In a 1983 survey of its members, the National Federation of Independent Business found about 60
percent of firms with commercial bank loans provide collateral as security for the loan agreement. They
also found that collateral secured 78 percent of the total volume of small business loans. Similarly, the
Interagency Task Force on Small Business Finance found, in a survey conducted in 1982, that some form of
collateral securing almost 80 percent of the dollar volume of large and small business loans from all sources.
These figures are cited in Leeth and Scott (1989).
6See Chesterman (1982), and also Petersen and Rajan (1994) (summarizing economtric analysis of NFIB
(1983)): “The owner’s reputation is apparently more important than that of the business” (at page15).
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ignores the potential for coercion in close domestic relationships. With perhaps an excessive
regard for the ex post regret obviously felt in those instances when loans or loved ones turn
sour, such third party guarantees have been dubbed in some legal scholarship a form of
‘sexually transmitted debt’.7
During the nineties courts in the Anglo-American world grappled with the policy trade-
offs involved in permitting the enforceability of third-party guarantees.8 As an example
the leading House of Lords case involved a wife suing to prevent a bank foreclosing on the
matrimonial home. She had co-signed a guarantee as backing for business interests in which
her husband was involved (and which did not directly involve her). In their decision the
law lords were aware that any desire for paternalistic circumvention of the usual legal and
economic norms of freedom to contract should be balanced against the concern that ‘the
wealth currently tied up in the matrimonial home does not become economically sterile’.9
This paper analyzes the tension between freedom and regulation of third party guarantees,
between the desire to permit efficiency increasing investment projects being undertaken
and also to protect guarantors who for whatever reason the law might regard as more
susceptable to coercive pressures within a relationship.10 A ban on such guarantees would
freeze forever all assets held in domestic use while unfettered freedom exposes a subset of
guarantor’s to intolerable risk of primary asset loss. The optimal guarantee contract will
trade off these concerns.
Aware of legal concern about ‘coercion’, banking associations in the United Kingdom
and United States have drawn up conventions which branch managers must take into ac-
count when presenting third-party guarantees for signing.11 Such conventions include the
7See for example Fehlberg (1997).
8See the surveys of cases and jurisdiction by (for example) Fehlberg (1995) and Trebilcock and
Ballantyne-Elliot (1998?).
9See Barclays Bank Plc v O’Brien [1994] 1 AC 180. The instance of signing of third party guarantees
appears to be classifiable into two broad categories - those where the guarantee is for a start-up and those
where the guarantee is for the refinancing of an already existing investment project. The Barclays Bank
case concerned the latter, and such cases do appear to offer cause for greater concern than do the former
type of cases (see Section 5 of this paper).
10The contractual legal doctrines protecting disadvantaged persons in common law countries fall under
the rubric of equity. For a summary of equitable doctrines in contract see Hanbury and Martin: Modern
Equity (2002).
11See for the UK BBA (1994).
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requirement on lenders to provide basic information about the nature and possible conse-
quences of signing a guarantee (like a ‘health warning’) and also to urge guarantees to seek
independent (that is, independent of the guarantee’s representatives) legal advice before
signing.12 The paradox appears to be that those aspects of a domestic relationship whose
presence is likely to lead a court to suspect coercion in the signing of a guarantee are pre-
cisely those that make the guarantee valuable from a bank’s perspective. Thus one bank
manager reported in a survey study his belief that ‘any borrower who is undergoing difficult
financial times is far more likely to repay a debt which is secured on his or her home so that
itself is a factor in assessing risk’ while another reported that the family home in particular
was an important ‘motivational asset’.13 As the author of the study concluded after her
survey of lending institutions, “private commitments enhanced public enforceability”:
Lenders acknowledged the problems inherent in taking security from a person
in an intimate relationship with the debtor, but they also emphasized the im-
portance to them in commercial terms of the surety’s emotional investments in
both the relationship with the debtor and the home (where relevant). [emphasis
original]
Economists familiar with the literature on financial contracting and the ‘income diver-
sion’ stories therein (see chapter 5 of Hart (1995)) will be unsurprised by these expressions
by lenders of the desirability of any factor that forces the borrower to pay out funds rather
than default, both in times of financial distress and even in good times.
While data on the incidence of third party guarantees is not available (and not easily
made available), the significance of internal financing for young or small businesses is known.
Thus Petersen and Rajan (1994), summarizing the National Survey of Small Business
Fincances (NSSBF) collected during 1988 and 1989 under the guidance of the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the Small Business Association note that (at
page 8):
12These are the same type of measures (although perhaps strengthened) adopted by the House of Lords
in its Barclays Bank decision.
13See Fehlberg (1997) at page 204.
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The smallest 10 percent of firms in our sample borrow about 50 percent of their
debt from banks. Another 27 percent comes from the firm’s owners and their
families. The table [referring to Table II on page 9 of their article] shows that
the fraction from personal (owner and family) sources declines to 10 percent for
the largest 10 percent of firms in our sample.
On the same page they go on to note that “The youngest firms (age less than or equal
to 2 years) rely most heavily on loans from the owner and his or her family” and again on
page 10 “[F]irms follow a ‘pecking order’ of borrowing over time, starting with the closest
sources (family) and then progressing to more arm’s length sources.”14 This data would
seem to suggest that, if data on the incidence of third party guarantees were available, it
would most likely be concentrated among young and/or small firms. They are likely to
play an important role in many start-up companies.
Obviously the first best can be achieved if comprehensive contracts could be written ex
ante. But the type of relationships modelled in this paper are not in reality governed by
comprehensive contracts or indeed often by any formal contract at all. Indeed, in some com-
mon law jurisdictions pre-marital contracts are not permitted as a matter of public policy,
and even in those jurisdictions where they are, their content is heavily circumscribed again
on public policy grounds.15 Even if they are permitted, there may be adverse signalling
reasons preventing their widespread adoption.16 The ‘incompleteness’ of the guarantee con-
tract permits ex post renegotiation and hence the possibility of that ‘coercion’ or hold-up
that exercised the minds of common law courts during the nineties. Paradoxically, it will
be seen that what is ‘bad’ for the guarantor (coercion) is ‘good’ from the point of view of
14The actual figures are: “The youngest 10 percent of firms in our sample borrow an amount equal to
0.32 of their book assets, while the oldest 10 percent of firms in our sample borrow only 0.15. The smallest
10 percent of firms in our sample borrow 0.22 of their book assets while the largest 10 percent of firms in
our sample borrow 0.30 of their book assets.” (at page 10, footnote 8).
15See Sanford N. Katz (Editor), Cross Currents: Family Law Policy in the US and England (2001).
16See for example Spier (1992). An obvious reason why complete guarantees are rarely seen (that is,
contracts which not only involve clauses concerning the loan but also the domestic relationship which
forms the context of the request for the guarantee) is the non-verifiable nature of many of the relationship
variables, and it is known that when some are unverifiable, it may be in the contractual parties’ interests
to leave other, verifiable variables unspecified also (see Holmstrom and Milgrom (1992) and Bernheim and
Whinston (1995)).
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overall societal welfare (more projects are financed ex ante), though only up to a point.
Relationship to literature The paper contributes to that recent literature which ana-
lyzes financial decisions from the ‘incomplete contracting’ perspective inaugurated by Gross-
man and Hart (1986) and applied to the financial contracting setting by Aghion and Bolton
(1992), Hart and Moore (1994) and Hart and Moore (1998).17 In these papers (let’s call
it the standard framework) a financially constrained entrepreneur seeks funds from an in-
vestor in order to exploit an investment opportunity. The funds are used to buy project
assets which in turn generate return streams. The theory assumes that, at the time the
loan contract is written, the parties to the contract are not able enforceably to condition
on all future states of the world (especially return streams), so that the contract instead
must specify who gets control of the project assets in the event the entrepreneur defaults.
Because loan repayment cannot be conditioned on return streams (meaning that any con-
tractually specified repayment amount can be renegotiated), default can occur strategically
and not just because returns are low. To minimize the incentives for such strategic de-
fault the investor must liquidate part of the project assets in the event of non-strategic
default, even though such liquidation is ex post inefficient. The reason such liquidation
has the right incentive effects is because future project return streams (which accrue only
to the entrepreneur) depend on the entrepreneur controlling the project assets. It is this
which gives the asset control decision in the standard framework an important ‘leverage’
effect between entrepreneur and investor. The current paper differs crucially from this
standard framework in that the asset on which the security is taken is not a project as-
set but a ‘relationship’ asset independent of the entrepreneur’s business. Consequently,
signing a security shifts the leverage from the investor/entrepreneur relationship to the
entrepreneur/guarantor relationship.
This indicates another aspect of the current paper that differs from the standard frame-
work, in that the model involves three agents rather than two. Papers extending the
standard framework to more than one investor include Bolton and Scharfstein (1996), De-
17For a summary of the standard framework and related literature see chapter 5 of Hart (1995). For
another early example utilizing a similar style of incomplete contracts model, but analyzing predation in
industrial organization theory instead, see Bolton and Scharfstein (1990).
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watripont and Maskin (1995), Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) and Berglo¨f and von Thadden
(1994). The first two involve multiple investors with the same asset claim while the second
two explore the effects of having different investors hold different asset claims. In both
types of paper the purpose of multiple investors and/or multiple claims is to harden the
budget constraint of the entrepreneur and consequently ease the threshold borrowing con-
dition for the investors, thus enabling more loans to be provided (and more investments
made). Indeed, anything (such as more agents involved in the bargaining, or asymmetric
information in the ex post bargaining) which makes renegotiation harder to achieve will
have this effect on the entrepreneur, with the cost of course that the possibility of efficient
renegotiation (that is, when default has been necessary) is lost.
Outline of paper Section 2 outlines the basic structure of the model and section 3 solves
for the optimal contract. Section 4 explores the relationship between coercion and invest-
ment determines when only an outside asset is available to the parties (the paradigmatic
case), while 5 assumes that both types of asset are available and explores the conditions de-
termining when total versus partial foreclosure is preferred, as well as the conditions under
which third-party guarantees are preferred to personal guarantees. Section 6 concludes.
2 The model
2.1 The ex ante contract
The agents At date 0 a bank (denoted B), an entrepreneur (denoted E) and a guar-
antor (denoted G) convene to sign a guaranteed loan contract to enable the entrepreneur
to invest in a long-term profitable project.18 The entrepreneur must borrow funds because
he is wealth-constrained; in particular, we assume that he has zero (liquid) wealth ex ante,
and we assume the same for the guarantor. All agents are risk neutral and discount factors
are normalized to zero.
18Hereafter the entrepreneur is referred to generically as ‘he’ and the guarantor as ‘she’.
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The project The project lasts two periods. There is no intertemporal interest rate.
The project provides non-negative returns of R˜1 (a random variable with support {0, x}) at
date 1 and R2 = r at date 2. In the first instance these returns accrue to the entrepreneur.
19
The commonly known distribution on R˜1 is given by:
20
R˜1 =
{
0 with probability 1− θ,
x with probability θ.
The project’s initial cost is K > 0. The project is ex ante viable or productive since
θx+r > K regardless of θ. Thus, we have biased the spousal guarantee problem in favor of
financing indubitably worthwhile investments. The amounts R1 and r are uncontractable:
that is, ex ante describable but ex post unenforecable (or ‘observable’ but not ‘verifiable’
in the language of Grossman and Hart (1986)).
The loan The entrepreneur borrows K from the bank at date 0 for a promise to
repay P at date 1.21 The promised repayment amount P is also uncontractable. One way
to think about this in concrete terms is to imagine the existence of a ‘savings account’
belonging to the entrepreneur into which the return is deposited when it accrues. Any
amount in this ‘savings account’ is untouchable by the bank, even in the event that the
entrepreneur defaults on the repayment of P . This is the ‘diversion’ or ‘stealing’ assumption
of Hart and Moore (1998), a possibly extreme but nonetheless useful assumption designed to
capture the more realistic phenomenon of managerial discretion in the use and disbursement
19These returns are specific to the entrepreneur - that is, neither the bank nor the guarantor can obtain
these returns from the project without the entrepreneur. However, we do not model the process by which
the entrepreneur generates these returns, assuming instead that they are exogenously given.
20Note that there is no loss of generality in confining attention to a two-state date 1 return, since even
if R1 is an interval (say R+) it is clear that it is never optimal for the entrepreneur to make a partial
payment, so that default in that more general case would be defined as not paying anything at all at date
1.
21The date 0 contract to be signed between the bank and the entrepreneur is a standard debt contract,
namely (B,P ). That is, the bank agrees to lend B at date 0 for a promise by the entrepreneur to repay
the non-contingent amount P at date 1. This paper does not consider the issue of whether other, more
elaborate, types of debt contract would be pareto superior to the standard debt contract examined here:
for example contracts utilizing options to own a la` No¨ldeke and Schmidt (1995), or contracts utilizing, in
the tradition of Maskin (1999), ex post message games such as is examined in the appendix to Aghion and
Bolton (1992) or in the latter half of Hart and Moore (1998) (where necessary and sufficient conditions for
a standard debt contract to be optimal are derived).
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of corporate funds. At least within the context of family businesses a reason for such
untouchability lies in the ability of entrepreneurs potentially to divert business profits into
family gifts and trusts.
Because the date 1 return is describable, the date 0 contract can stipulate the date 1
payment P to be conditional on R˜1. Thus the contract can stipulate that at date 1 the
entrepreneur should repay P0 when R1 = 0 and Px when R1 = x. However, because any
contract terms conditioned on R˜1 are ex post unenforceable, we need to denote the actual
payment made by the entrepreneur at date 1 by Pˆ . We restrict this date 1 action set to be
the same as the date 0 contractually specified repayment schedule: Pˆ ∈ {P0, Px}. Actual
date 1 repayment is contractable.
Security asset Because of the noncontractability of the return stream, the bank
requires security for the loaned funds K. There exist two types of asset which might act
as security. Call the combined assets AH. A security on the assets (either or both) is
contractable.
The first asset (asset A) is a business asset that will be bought with the borrowed funds.
It lasts one period. This asset is essential to the production process: in combination with
the entrepreneur’s skill it produces the return stream over the two periods. If the asset is
liquidated at date 1, then the entrepreneur is unable to earn the date 2 return r. The date
1 liquidation value to the bank is LA = αr, where α ∈ [0, 1).
The second asset (asset H) is a shared non-liquid relationship asset which is completely
independent of the business. It has a deterministic market value of z, which can be inter-
preted as the value of (say) a family home to its occupants. The date 1 liquidation value to
the bank is LH = λz, where λ ∈ [0, 1). This modelling assumption captures the fact that
the relationship asset is worth more when maintained as a relationship asset than when in
the possession of the bank. Specifically, it captures the fact that a relationship asset like
a family home provides a value to its occupants not encapsulated in liquidated sale price
alone.
Note that when both assets are used as security, the date 1 liquidation value of the assets
AH to the bank is LAH = αr+λz. These liquidation values constitute ex post exogenously
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determined inefficiencies which play an important role in the ex post renegotiation to be
described below. They are summarized in Panel A of Table 1.
Relationship asset share At date 2 (when the model ends) the relationship asset is
sold and consumed by the entrepreneur and/or guarantor according to their exogenously
determined share of the asset. Let SE ∈ [0, 1] denote the entrepreneur’s date 2 share of
the relationship asset (or the date 2 sale proceeds thereof). Hence the guarantor’s share is
(1− SE).
Entrepreneur’s promised payment to guarantor The guarantor must be com-
pensated for the risk of permitting (her share of) the relationship asset to act as security
for the loan. We denote by yi (where i ∈ {0, x}) the amount the entrepreneur promises to
pay the guarantor at date 2 (conditional on the entrepreneur’s date 1 actual repayment Pˆ )
in return for her permitting the relationship asset to be utilized as security. Note that yi
need not be interpreted as an explicit payment arising out of the guarantee contract but
can be interpreted more expansively as the promise of a ‘standard of living’ arising out
of the relationship. The yi’s are enforceable since they are conditioned on actual date 1
repayment by the entrepreneur. Such enforcement can be interpreted as divorce law in the
case of spoual guarantees.
Contractual provision for default We will assume that the assets are discrete
so that they cannot be partially liquidated. In the case of a family home at least this
assumption is realistic. The most general type of default provision then specifies that when
the entrepreneur makes a date 1 payment Pˆ , the bank has the right to liquidate the secured
asset(s) with probability β(Pˆ ) ≤ 1.22 The date 0 contract will therefore specify that when
the entrepreneur makes the payment Px the bank has the right to liquidate the secured
asset with probability βx, and when the entrepreneur makes the repayment P0 the bank
has the right to liquidate the secured asset with probability β0. The βi’s (where i ∈ {0, x})
are enforceable since they are conditioned on actual date 1 repayment by the entrepreneur.
22A model of this type was first used in Bolton and Scharfstein (1990).
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Payoffs Payoffs for the agents are described in the next section when the optimal
guarantee is solved. They are linear in income/payments and (for the entrepreneur and
guarantor) linear in asset share and (for the bank) linear in expected foreclosure value.
The relative greater importance of the relationship asset to the guarantor vis-a-viz the
entrepreneur is modelled via a weight function φ(λ) which is increasing in λ, explained
further below.
Contractability It is useful to summarize the contractability assumptions in the
model. The return stream and agent payoffs are not contractible, while the asset(s) and
the entrepreneur’s actual date 1 payments are contractible. Contractibility assumptions
rest on the idea that it is easier to divert cash flow than physical, non-liquid assets, a
distinction emphasised in Hart and Moore (1998).
The date 0 contract We assume that the entrepreneur has all the ex ante bargaining
power and chooses the date 0 contract Γ = {P0, Px, β0, βx, y0, yx}. The first two terms
(conditioned on R˜1) are not enforceable but the remaining terms (conditioned on Pˆ ) are
enforceable. Since the first two terms are not enforceable, at date 1 the entrepreneur might
choose to ‘deviate’ from the loan repayment amounts specified in Γ.
The timeline of the game at date 1 is as follows. First nature moves determining whether
the date 1 return is either x or 0. Then the entrepreneur decides whether to pay Px or
P0. Depending on this vbnrepayment amount, the bank acquires the right to foreclose on
the secured asset(s) with probability βx or β0. However, liquidation of the secured asset(s)
is not automatic because such liquidation is ex post inefficient. The agents would prefer
to renegotiate the ex ante contractual terms βx and β0, setting them to zero and dividing
amongst themselves the ex post surplus thereby saved. If renegotiation suceeds then the
secured asset(s) is not liquidated and if it fails then it is liquidated by the bank. The
specifics of renegotation is outlined in subsection 2.2. The timeline for the complete model
is summarized in Figure 1.
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Figure 1: Spousal Guarantee Timeline
First-best If a comprehensive contract could be signed, then given the assumptions
on the productivity of the project the entrepreneur would have no difficulty getting a bank
to finance the project, and the first-best would be achieved. Note therefore that securing
the loan would not be necessary and, if nonetheless undertaken, liquidation would never
be part of a first-best outcome. However, the inability to contract on the return stream
means that, without a mechanism to enforce date 1 repayment, no bank will lend to the
entrepreneur in spite of the overall viability of the project. The usual mechanism in the
literature is a security over the project asset A that is bought with the borrowed funds.
Since the entrepreneur values continuance of the project, the possibility of liquidation of
A at date 1 gives the bank leverage over the entrepreneur ensuring that the latter pays
the loan out of the date 1 return stream. Securing the relationship asset rather than the
project asset switches the leverage problem from the bank/entrepreneur relationship to the
entrepreneur/guarantor relationship, as we now see.
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Table 1: Table of ex post values
Panel A
Secured Asset Foreclosure Value
i = A LA = αr
i = H LH = λz
i = AH LAH = αr + λz
Panel B
Secured Asset Total Ex Post Surplus Value
i = A ΠA = r − αr
i = H ΠH = z − λz
i = AH ΠAH = r + z − (αr + λz)
Panel C
Secured Asset Entrepreneur’s Share of Ex Post Surplus
i = A gAE = τE(r − 2αr)
i = H gHE = τE(z − 2λz)
i = AH gAHE = τE[r + z − 2(αr + λz)]
2.2 The ex post renegotiation
Renegotiation takes the form of the entrepreneur bribing the bank not to exercise its right
to liquidate the foreclosed asset(s). Since the entrepreneur has zero ex ante (liquid) wealth,
such a bribe is only possible in the case where R1 = x. If the payment of P0 is called
a default, then default can either be either strategic or necessary according to whether it
occured when R1 equalled x or 0 respectively. Consequently there can be no renegotiation
after a necessary default while after a strategic default renegotiation is possible since the
funds potentially exist to ‘buy back’ the seized asset(s)).
The ex post surplus over which the agents renegotiate depends on which asset(s) is used
as security. Denote by Πi the social surplus salvaged by the parties when the liquidation of
asset i (where i = A,H or AH) is prevented via renegotation. These different amounts are
shown in Panel B of Table 1. Note that they depend on the exogenously given liquidation
values so that the ex post surplus is also exogenous.
In the literature a number of bargaining conventions are used, the most common being
the Nash bargaining solution where the parties equally split the surplus. Because in sections
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4 and 5 we wish to explore the effects of differing bargaining power between entrepreneur
and guarantor, in this paper renegotiation takes the form of Generalized Nash Bargaining.
We assume that the bank is exactly compensated for the loss of liquidation value which it
gives up, and that the entrepreneur and guarantor then engage in two-way bargaining over
the surplus that remains. The agents are exogenously endowed with ex post bargaining
power τi (where i = E or G) which sum to one. Appendix A presents the details while
Panel C of Table 1 summarizes the results.
As a final note to renegotiation, it is worth pointing out that since the relationship
asset H is contractable and becomes liquid at date 2, it is possible within this model for
the entrepreneur to propose at date 1 (say in exchange for forbearance on the part of
the bank in foreclosing on the project asset A) a share of the date 2 relationship asset
proceeds. However, for convenience in what follows we rule out this possibility of ‘constant
recontracting’ on the security over H.
3 The optimal guarantee
In this section we set out the optimization program that the entrepreneur solves at date
0 and use it to characterize the optimal contracts for each of the three possible cases of
secured asset, namely, for asset i where i ∈ {A,H,AH}. We state the model in its general
form, and then at the end briefly give the concrete forms of the solution variables that will
be needed in the rest of the paper (in fact, only β) for each of the three cases of i = A, H and
AH. We are interested in the renegotiation-proof contract, where the possibility of future
renegotiation is anticipated by the parties when they come to draw up the date 0 contract so
that renegotiation does not in fact occur in equilibrium. Renegotiation-proofness manifests
itself in the optimization problems in the form of an added constraint.
At date 0 the entrepreneur solves the following linear program (call it (F(i))), choosing
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over Γi = {P0, Px, β0, βx, y0, yx} to maximize his expected payoff23
θ[x− Px − yx + (1− βxκir)r + (1− βxκiz)SEz + βxgiE] (1)
+ (1− θ)[−P0 − y0 + (1− β0κir)r + (1− β0κiz)SEz]
subject to the individual rationality constraint of the bank (IRB)
θ[Px + βxL
i] + (1− θ)[P0 + β0Li] ≥ K (2)
as well as to the individual rationality constraint of the guarantor (IRG)
θ[yx + (1− βxκiz)(1− SE)z + βxgiG] (3)
+ (1− θ)[y0 + (1− β0κiz)(1− SE)z] ≥ (1− SE)z
and, in order to ensure that the entrepreneur does not strategically default when R1 = x,
subject also to the following ‘renegotiation constraint’ (RC)
x− Px − yx + (1− βxκir)r + (1− βxκiz)SEz + βxgiE (4)
≥ x− P0 − y0 + (1− β0κir)r + (1− β0κiz)SEz + β0giE
and subject to the following ‘limited liability’ constraints for the entrepreneur and guarantor
owing to the assumption of ex ante zero liquid wealth
P0 ≤ 0 and Px ≤ x
0 ≤ y0 ≤ r and 0 ≤ yx ≤ x+ r − Px (5)
and finally subject to feasibility constraints on the foreclosure probabilities
0 ≤ β0, βx ≤ 1
There are three models in one here, depending on whether i = A, H or AH.24 The
difference between the models depends only on the different values of κir and κ
i
z for each
23Note that each of these contractual terms should also have an i superscript, but to avoid notational
clutter we omit them.
24There is of course a fourth model entailed in this general form, which of course we ignore, namely, the
case of no security at all.
14
value of i. The κ’s are indicator functions, taking on the values of zero or one only. In
particular we have
κir =
{
1 when i = AH,A
0 when i = H
and
κiz =
{
1 when i = AH,H
0 when i = A
The payoffs of each of the three agents are written assuming that the contractual terms
of Γi are honored. Thus, equation (1) shows the entrepreneur’s payoff for the two cases
when R1 = x and he pays the bank Px (and the guarantor yx) and when R1 = 0 and he
pays the bank P0 (and the guarantor y0). When Px is paid then with probability 1−βx the
entrepreneur keeps the secured asset(s) while with probability βx he needs to buy it back
and then split the surplus with the guarantor, giving him giE. The payoffs for the bank
and guarantor are derived in the same way. Regarding equation (4), the LHS is taken from
the LHS of (1) while the RHS has the same form except that now the entrepreneur has
paid P0 so the other contractual terms (β and y) conform to that payment. The second
renegotiation constraint, ensuring that the entrepreneur pays Px instead of P0 when R1 = 0,
is otiose because when income is zero it is not feasible for the entrepreneur to pay Px due
to the assumption that the entrepreneur is wealth constrained. For the same reason we
need not include renegotiation payoffs for either the entrepreneur or the guarantor for the
case when R1 = 0 since they are automatically zero. Finally, both sides of both inequalities
of 5 model the fact that, for both the guarantor (the LHS of both inequalities) and the
entrepreneur (the RHS of both inequalities), the relationship asset is untouchable when it
comes to agreeing on the possible amounts of the side payments (the y’s) between them.
The following proposition and corollary characterize the optimal contract.
Proposition 1 (Contract Characterization) In the optimal contract
(i) P0 = 0,
(ii) y0 = y0(1− κir) ≥ 0,
(iii) βx = 0,
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(iv) both the bank’s and guarantor’s individual rationality constraints bind,
(v) the renegotiation constraint binds.
Proof See Appendix B.
The proofs of parts (i) and (ii) are trivial, following immediately from assumptions
on the contracting technology made in subsection 2.1. As part (ii) of the propostition
indicates, the main difference between the solutions to (F(AH)) and (F(A)) when compared
with the solution to (F(H)) is that in the latter case y0 is not necessarily zero. The reason
is that, when R1 = 0 and the entrepreneur pays (as the contract requires) P0, foreclosure of
the secured relationship asset with probability β0 (as the contract requires) still leaves the
project asset available to generate the date 2 return r, from which a positive payment to
the guarantor can be made if desired. Unsurprisingly, now that it is only the relationship
asset which carries the security, the guarantor needs to be compensated even more for the
greater risk of offering up her property. In fact it will be seen that in this case y0 = r,
the maximum possible payment. Part (iii) is proved by showing that a strictly positive βx
cannot be optimal, since in that case decreasing βx without changing the payoffs of the
bank and guarantor strictly increases the entrepreneur’s payoff. The intuition for the result
is that the contract needs to provide the entrepreneur with incentives not to strategically
default. Foreclosing on the secured assets when R1 = x gives the entrepreneur precisely
the opposite incentives from the point of view of the goal of preventing strategic default.
Part (iv) is proved by utilizing the fact that the entreprenuer, who has all the ex ante
bargaining power, maximizes his payoff by paying both the bank and guarantor as little as
possible. The proof of part (v) is by contradiction - the relaxed program is solved and the
result shown to contradict the ignored renegotiation constraint. Essential to the proof is
the assumption that the y’s cannot be paid out of the guarantor’s (or entrepreneur’s) share
of the relationship asset. The intuition is that the renegotiation constraint must bind in
order to provide the incentive for the entrepreneur to repay the debt in the good income
state, since no other reason exists for him to repay the loan in that state. If there is no
incentive for the entrepreneur to repay in the good income state, then the guarantor will
not sign the contract.
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Although we do not show it explicitly, it is worth pointing out one difference between
the three specific models. The main difference between the solutions to (F(AH)) and (F(H))
when compared with the solution to (F(A)) is that in the latter case yx = 0. Since the
guarantor’s asset is not at risk, paying a positive yx simply makes the guarantor an investor
in the project without any quid pro quo, something that is clearly not in the entrepreneur’s
interest to permit. However, a negative yx is not permitted by 5, so the optimal payment
to the guarantor sets yx equal to zero: the guarantor is irrelevant. It should also be
noted that in model (F(A)), even though there is no relationship asset so that the presence
of the guarantor is irrelevant to that specific model, nonetheless, because of the ex post
bargaining convention adopted, she still obtains some positive surplus. This is an artifact
of all generalised Nash-type bargaining models.
Corollary 1 the optimal β0 is bounded away from zero.
Proof The corollary follows immediately from the proof of part (v) of proposition 1.
See Appendix B for details.
Even though asset foreclosure is ex post inefficient when R1 = 0, nonetheless it will
occur. This inefficiency arises from the twin effects of limited liability and contractual
incompleteness. The model is characterized by the fact that the greater the ex post inef-
ficiency when R1 = 0, the greater the ex ante efficiency. Stated another way, there exists
a trade-off between ex post costs of financial distress and ex ante efficiencies in ensuring
that viable projects are undertaken. Financial distress in the case of third-party guaran-
tees involves important relationship asset loss, which hits the guarantor in particular hard.
From the point of view of a court deciding between ex ante versus ex post efficiency, it is
not obvious normatively which should receive judicial preference. Ex post efficiency should
be favored in the case of a one-shot decision, but in a repeated context such reasoning
undercuts the valuable commitment role of the law in enabling contracting parties to use
[ . . . ]. How the courts should balance these twin concerns has long been an issue in
jurisprudence.
Proposition 1 enables us to simplify (Fi) and consequently to find this optimal level of
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contractual inefficiency.25
Proposition 2 (Contractual Inefficiency)
(i) In the optimal contract, the efficiency loss due to contractual incompleteness is
ELi ≡ (1− θ)βi0[κirr + κizz − Li] (6)
(ii) while the optimal foreclosure probability is
βi0 ≡
K − (1− κir)y0
θ[κirr + κ
i
zS
Ez − giE] + (1− θ)[Li − κiz(1− SE)z]
(7)
(which will be a solution to (Fi) provided the RHS is not greater than one).
Proof See Appendix B.
The efficiency loss due to contractual incompleteness is the expected loss of surplus
when the date 1 return is zero (with probability 1 − θ) and the bank gets the right to
foreclose on the secured asset(s) (with probability βi0). The term in square brackets in 6 is
the exogenous ex post surplus Πi.
Equations 6 and 7 can be written in terms of the model’s exogenous parameters (from
Table 1). Depending on the value of i, this table will give different parameterized forms for
the two equations. For example, for the case of i = AH we have
βAH0 ≡
K
θ[r + SEz − τE(r + z − 2[αr + λz])] + (1− θ)[(αr + λz)− (1− SE)z] (8)
ELAH ≡ (1− θ)K[r + z − (αr + λz)]
θ[r + SEz − τE(r + z − 2[αr + λz])] + (1− θ)[(αr + λz)− (1− SE)z] (9)
and the parameterized forms of β0 and EL can be easily found for the other two cases also.
These parameterized forms will be used in the rest of the paper.
25Here we are re-inserting the superscript on the contract variable β. (See footnote 23)
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4 Outside security assets only
Often the parties to the transaction are unlikely to have the luxury of an inside asset. This
section examines the paradigmatic case of outside guarantees and the possibility of coercion
when only the relationship asset is able to be secured. That is, we focus on the case of
asset H alone.
Writing βH0 and EL
H in terms of the model’s exogenous parameters (from Table 1)
gives
βH0 ≡
K − r
θ[SEz − τE(z − 2λz)] + (1− θ)[λz − (1− SE)z] (10)
ELH ≡ (1− θ){K − r}[1− λ]
θ[SE − τE(1− 2λ)] + (1− θ)[λ− (1− SE)] (11)
Note that the efficiency loss does not depend on the value of the secured asset z. The
numerator of 10 can be either negative or positive depending on whether the second period
return is greater than or less than the project cost. The paradigmatic case might be
thought to involve a residential house value orders of magnitude greater than the possible
return from the project. This would certainly be true for cases of refinancing or bridging
loans taken out in times of cash-flow problems (the House of Lords case mentioned in the
introduction falls into this category). But since it is known that outside guarantees are also
used to finance start-ups, it is not inconceivable that at least in some of those instances
final period return is much greater than the value of the residential home used to support it.
We have the following proposition determining the risk profile of projects which an outside
security can support.
Proposition 3 (Risk Profile) Define θ¯(λ, τE, S
E) ≡ 1− S
E − λ
1− λ− τE(1− 2λ) and assume that
1− λ ≥ SE ≥ τE(1− 2λ). Then
(i) the relationship asset serves as a commitment device when
(a) (for K > r) θ > θ¯, and
(b) (for K ≤ r) θ ≤ θ¯
19
(ii) For each of the arguments of θ¯ we have that θ¯ is decreasing in SE and λ, and increasing
(decreasing) in τE when λ >
1
2
(λ < 1
2
).
Proof See Appendix B.
The assumption comes from the need to ensure that the parameters λ, τE and S
E are
such that θ¯ ∈ (0, 1). It is easily verified that the denominator of θ¯ is always a positive
fraction. Consequently the LHS of the assumption ensures that the numerator is also
positive. If it is violated, then part (i) of the proposition informs us that (since θ¯ can’t be
negative and so is at its lower bound of zero) start-ups will not be financed regardless of
their risk profile while all refinancing projects will be. The RHS of the assumption ensures
that θ¯ is less than one. If it is violated then part (i) of the proposition informs us that
(since θ¯ can’t be greater than one and so is at its upper bound of one) refinancing will
never occur while all start-ups (regardless of risk profile) will be financed. The assumption
therefore ensures that both types of projects remain possible given the parameters.
The proof of part (i) of the proposition relies simply on the feasibility constraint on β0
(in particular, that β0 must be positive). As an aside, the fact that β0 must also be a fraction
places a constraint on the size of the absolute value of K − r, in particular |K − r| < 2z.
As we would expect, the greater the value of the available outside asset the higher the cost
of the project that can be financed for any given return profile. Note also that when K = r
then θ can take any value, in particular, it can take the value specified in the proposition.
The proof of part (ii) involves finding the signs of the respective derivatives.
Part (i) of the proposition states that the risk profile which can be supported with an
outside security asset depends on whether the funds are required for refinancing an existing
project or are required for a start-up. In the case of refinancing, since K > r, all the risk
is carried by the date 1 return. This greater risk means that only low risk projects ought
to be funded (recall that θ is the probability of the good date 1 return). In the case of a
start-up, since the risk of eventual project non-viability is much less, high risk projects can
be supported with the outside security.
Part (ii) of the proposition shows that the comparative statics of changes in the parame-
ters on changes in the cut-off θ depends on which case (refinancing or start-up) is examined.
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In particular, increases in entrepreneur bargaining power, thought to be beneficial by banks
and suspicious by courts, can be seen to affect the risk profile of the two different types of
project differently. In addition it depends on the amount of closeness in the relationship.
When the relationship is not close, then in the case of refinancing it leads to fewer and
fewer low risk projects being financed, and in the case of start-ups to more and more low
risk projects being financed. In the limit as τE approaches one, regardless of risk profile,
no projects get refinanced while all start-ups are funded. The opposite results obtain when
the relationship is close. The same results obtain when the focus is on relationship close-
ness rather than intra-familial bargaining power; that is, the more close the relationship
(lower λ), the fewer high risk projects are refinanced and the more high risk start-ups are
supported.
In this model there is no inherent tension between the views of the guarantor and bank
regarding the utility of intrafamilial factors for enabling project finance. The different
perspectives mentioned in the introduction might reflect different views of the nature of
the project. In this model the type of project dealt with is common knowledge ex ante. Ex
post, if the courts perceive that the husband possesses a high degree of influence over a wife
and that the project was for refinancing (as occured in the House of Lords case mentioned
in the introduction) then suspicion is rightly raised about why the guarantee was signed at
all. In this model, where all information is known and agents are rational, such contracts
would not be signed, so that an explanation for such an occurance would need to lie in
some behavioural economic explanation outside the scope of this paper.
One of the factors that courts are right to focus on is entrepreneurial asset share. This
can be seen via further examination of the constraint the assumption in the proposition
places on the parameters of the model. Note that it can be summarized as a correspondence
SE(λ, τE). Consider the following five cases where λ is treated as a parameter rather than
a variable:
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Value of λ Range for SE
0 [1, τE]
1
4
[3
4
, 1
2
τE]
1
2
[1
2
, 0]
3
4
[1
4
,−1
2
τE]
1 [0,−τE]
The pattern can be summarized as follows. The entrepreneur’s share of the relationship
asset is increasing in relationship closeness and decreasing in his bargaining power. When
the relationship is close the size of the set of possible asset shares depends on his bargaining
power, the more he has, the smaller the range of possible asset shares. When the relationship
is not close (λ > 1
2
) then his bargaining power no longer matters in determining the size
of the set and the size of the feasible asset share is determined solely by the level of
relationship closeness. The two extreme values of λ are worth noting. When λ = 0, so
that the relationship is very close, the range of the entrepreneur’s share of the relationship
asset is decreasing in his bargaining power. In particular, the more powerful he is within
the relationship, the greater the share of the asset he needs to ensure that the relationship
can act as a commit device to support the project. In the limit when he has all the
bargaining power the model mandates that he also completely own the asset. This is
equivalent to saying (if the guarantor in fact owns the asset) that, in close marriages (say)
with a dominant husband, the third-party security should not be signed, confirming the
suspicions of the courts. When λ = 1 we have etc
An important consideration in public policy is maintaining the institution of marriage.
If there were no relationships then there would be no efficiency loss in security guarantees.
A policy of promoting closeness in relationships therefore would set λ = 0. The following
proposition states the welfare effects of changes in the parameters of the model.
Proposition 4 (Welfare)
(i) [Incomplete proposition - still to do]
Case K > r: ELH is decreasing in SE, increasing in τE as λ <
1
2
, and ?? in λ as
Case K < r: ELH is increasing in SE, decreasing in τE as λ <
1
2
, and ?? in λ as
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(ii) Define limλ→0ELH ≡ ELH = (1− θ)(K − r)
θ[SE − τE]− (1− θ)[1− SE] . Then
(a) (when K > r).
(b) (when K ≤ r)
Proof See Appendix B.
[Summarize results.]
[Tension between funding more projects and promoting relationships.]
5 Outside versus inside security assets
5.1 Total versus partial foreclosure
Define partial foreclosure as the foreclosure of only asset A or only asset H, and total
foreclosure as the foreclosure of both assets AH. In the next subsection we are interested in
comparing partial liquidations only. In this subsection we determine the conditions under
which partial foreclosure will be preferred. We assume that securing oneself up to the
eyeballs is not something that either the entrepreneur or guarantor want. It is not the
case that for all parameter values partial liquidation is preferred to total liquidation, as the
following proposition shows.
Proposition 5 (Partial Liquidation) There exists a θˆ(α, λ, τE, S
E, r, z,K) ∈ (0, 1) such
that partial liquidation is preferred to total liquidation when θ > θˆ; otherwise total liquida-
tion is preferred.
Proof See Appendix B.
The lower is θ the more risky the investment project. When the project is risky, un-
derstandably the entrepreneur must choose to permit the bank to foreclose on all available
assets. Put another way, the more assets one has available to act as collateral, either the
greater the loan one can take out or the riskier the project one can finance. By confining
ourselves to situations where only one asset at most is permitted to be foreclosed, we are
limiting the riskiness of projects that can be financed by spousal guarantees.
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5.2 Comparing partial foreclosure
In this subsection we assume that the conditions ensuring partial foreclosure expounded
in the previous subsection hold. In order to investigate the conditions under which we
might anticipate the use of either personal or third party guarantees we need to compare
contractual inefficiencies in these two different scenarios. The following proposition outlines
the conditions determining whether personal or third-party guarantees are likely to be used.
Proposition 6 (Guarantee Conditions)
(i) Investment Risk There exists a θ˜(α, λ, τE, S
E, r, z,K) ∈ (0, 1) such that when θ < θ˜
the entrepreneur prefers foreclosing the project asset (personal guarantees) and when
θ > θ˜ the entrepreneur prefers foreclosing the relationship asset (third party guaran-
tees).
(ii) Entrepreneur Bargaining Power There exists a τ˜E(α, λ, θ, S
E, r, z,K) ∈ (0, 1) such
that when τ < τ˜E the entrepreneur prefers foreclosing the relationship asset (third
party guarantees) and when τ > τE the entrepreneur prefers foreclosing the project
asset (personal guarantees).
(iii) Entrepreneur Relationship Asset Share There exists a S˜E(α, λ, τE, θ, r, z,K) ∈
(0, 1) such that when S˜E < SE the entrepreneur prefers foreclosing the project asset
(personal guarantees) and when S˜E > SE the entrepreneur prefers foreclosing the
relationship asset (third party guarantees).
(iv) Ex post Inefficiency
(a) There exists a λ˜(α, λ, τE, S
E, r, z,K) ∈ (0, 1) such that when λ > λ˜ the en-
trepreneur prefers foreclosing the relationship asset (third party guarantees) and
when λ < λ˜ the entrepreneur prefers foreclosing the project asset (personal guar-
antees).
(b) There exists a α˜(α, λ, τE, S
E, r, z,K) ∈ (0, 1) such that when α > α˜ the en-
trepreneur prefers foreclosing the project asset (personal guarantees) and when
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α < α˜ the entrepreneur prefers foreclosing the relationship asset (third party
guarantees).
Proof See Appendix B.
The proofs of each part involves comparing the expected efficiency loss from contrac-
tual incompleteness in the two cases of when the project asset is foreclosed and when the
relationship asset is foreclosed. Part (i) shows that third party guarantees open up the pos-
sibility to financing of low risk projects while personal guarantees open the possibility of
financing low risk projects. Parts (ii) and (iv) separate the effects of (ex post) distribution
and (ex post) inefficiency. Part (ii) of proposition 6 indicates that court concern with ‘coer-
cion’ per se appears not to be misplaced. The greater the entrepreneur’s bargaining power
viz-a-vis the guarantor, the more he prefers to use his own project assets as security rather
than an outside asset. Consequently, if a court finds that there exists a large potential
for coercion in a relationship it has the right to wonder why it is being asked to examine
the validity of a spousal guarantee. Part (iv) shows that whether third-party guarantees
are used depends on the size of the ex post inefficiency - the larger the potential ex post
waste, the more efficient it becomes to use the other asset instead as a commitment device.
Third party guarantees have value only when they are able to act as substitute leverage
for that lost between the entrepreneur and bank when the option of securing project as-
sets is waived. Part (iii) indicates how that substitute leverage is effected by giving the
entrepreneur a greater stake in the potential loss of the relationship asset (when that is
the asset secured). A lower SE increases the capacity of the relationship asset to act as
leverage, which makes foreclosing on the relationship asset more favorable.
[comparison of θˆ and θ˜] [comparative stats on various of these]
6 Conclusion
This paper analyzes a form of secured transactions that has received much judicial attention
during the last fifteen years. The main theme of the paper is that the relationship between
guarantor and guarantee, represented in this paper as coercion and relative asset share,
has both socially beneficial and detrimental effects. Third party guarantees involve an
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inherent tension between the good and bad effects of coercion within relationships. The
good effect allows otherwise wealth constrained individuals to finance projects that would
not otherwise obtain financing, involving an efficiency loss to society (given the assumption
in this paper that such projects are socially beneficial). The mechanism by which this is
achieved is precisely via the exploitation of that relationship connection that exists between
guarantor and guarantee - a connection which reassures banks that the loan will be repaid.
However, that connection can also lead to parameter values in which the project is high
risk and social welfare has decreased. Indeed, it was shown that in the paradigmatic third
party guarantee case, where such guarantees are likely to have their most socially beneficial
impact (in terms of opening financial access to low risk projects), too much coercion leads
to the situation that any project is supported regardless of risk profile.
A Generalized Nash bargaining
Let giE denote the share of ex post surplus obtained by the entrepreneur during renegotation
(where i = A, H or AH). Correspondingly, let giB denote the share of the ex post surplus
obtained by the bank and giG the share of the ex post surplus obtained by the guarantor.
Obviously giE + g
i
B + g
i
G = Π
i. We always assume that the bank is exactly compensated
for giving up its right to liquidate asset i so that giB ≡ Li. Let the exogenous bargaining
powers of the entrepreneur and guarantor be τE and τG respectively, where τE + τG = 1.
The generalized Nash bargaining problem for two people takes the following form
max
giE ,g
i
G
φ ≡ (giE)τE(giG)1−τE
subject to
giE + g
i
G = Π
i − Li
The first order condition is
− φ(1− τE)
Πi − Li − giE
+
φτE
giE
= 0
which after manipulation gives
giE = τE(Π
i − Li)
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The entrepreneur’s share of the ex post renegotiaiton surplus increases as his power within
the relationship increases.
B Mathematical proofs
Proof of Proposition 1 (Contract Characterization)
(i) From P0 ≤ 0 in ?? we have either P0 = 0 or P0 < 0. Assume the latter. This means
that the bank (it can’t be the guarantor, who also has zero (liquid) wealth) pays the
entrepreneur something when R1 = 0. But then it would be more socially efficient
(since foreclosing on either the project or relationship asset is always inefficient) to
increase P0 and so reduce β0. Hence P0 = 0.
(ii) For the cases of i = AH,A: From ?? we know that y0 ≥ 0. The amount y0 is paid
at date 2 when the entrepreneur pays P0 at date 1. Under the assumption that the
contractual terms are carried out as intended ex ante, such a payment occurs only
when R1 = 0. Under that scenario the assets are foreclosed with probability β0 and
not foreclosed with probability 1 − β0. In the former case y0 = 0 since there is no
income from either date 1 or date 2 with which to make the payment. In the latter
case date 2 income (r) does accrue to the entrepreneur so that a positive payment is
not infeasible, but the assumption on the contracting technology made in subsection
2.1 (namely, that the parties to the contract are constrained to stipulate the same
amount, y0, in both cases) means that the agents choose the lessor amount when
designing the contract at date 0. Hence y0 = 0. Note that this last part of the proof
only applies to the cases where the business asset is secured. When it is not secured
(as in the case of i = H) then even when the (relationship) asset is foreclosed, the
business asset still exists to provide a date 2 return of r. The indicator function κir
can be used to encapsulate all three models in one term, as shown in part (ii) of the
proposition.
(iii) Suppose to the contrary that βx is strictly positive at an optimum. Now reduce
βx by some infinitesimal amount, say , without thereby changing the bank’s and
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guarantor’s payoffs (this can be effected if we simultaneously ensure that Px is in-
creased by Li in the bank’s payoff and yx is decreased by [κ
i
z(1 − SE)z − giG]
in the guarantor’s payoff). With these changes, the entrepreneur’s payoff changes
by −θ[Li − κiz(1 − SE)z + giG − (κirr + κizSEz) + giE] and the LHS of the rene-
gotiation constraint changes by −[Li − κiz(1 − SE)z + giG − (κirr + κizSEz) + giE].
Hence, the assumption which began this proof will be contradicted provided that
[Li − κiz(1 − SE)z + giG − (κirr + κizSEz) + giE] < 0. Now note from Table 1 that
giG+g
i
E = Π
i−Li. Incorporating this and rearranging gives Πi−(κirr+κizz) which can
easily be verified as negative for each case of i by consulting Table 1. These changes
therefore strictly increase the entrepreneur’s payoff while slackening the renegotiation
constraint. Hence we have shown the contradiction in the assumption that a strictly
positive βx can be an optimum.
(iv) The bank’s individual rationality constraint binds at an optimum since, if it did not,
it would be possible to decrease Px and consequently raise the entrepreneur’s payoff.
Such a change would not effect the guarantor’s payoff and would slacken the renego-
tiation constraint.
The guarantor’s individual rationality constraint binds at an optimum since if it did
not, it would be possible to decrease yx and consequently raise the entrepreneur’s
payoff. Such a change would not effect the bank’s payoff and would slacken the
reneogotiation constraint.
(v) Suppose to the contrary that (4) is slack. We solve for the optimal contract assuming
this and show that the solution to this relaxed program violates the renegotiation
constraint. Using the results of parts (i)-(iv) of proposition 1 the optimization problem
(F(i)) can be reformulated as choosing over [Px, β0, yx, y0] to maximize
θ[x− Px + r − yx + SEz] (B.1)
+ (1− θ)[−y0(1− κir) + (1− β0κir)r + (1− β0κiz)SEz]
subject to:
θPx + (1− θ)β0Li −K = 0 (B.2)
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θ[yx + (1− SE)z] + (1− θ)[y0(1− κir) + (1− β0κiz)(1− SE)z]− (1− SE)z = 0 (B.3)
x− Px + r − yx + SEz (B.4)
≥ x− y0(1− κir) + (1− β0κir)r + (1− β0κiz)SEz + β0giE (B.5)
Px ≤ x (B.6)
0 ≤ y0 ≤ r and 0 ≤ yx ≤ x+ r − Px (B.7)
0 ≤ β0 ≤ 1 (B.8)
Ignoring the renegotiation constraint (B.4), we can substitute (B.3) and (B.2) into
(B.1) to obtain (after some manipulation and collecting the β0 terms) a reformulated
objective function in terms of β0
θx−K + [r + SEz]− (1− θ)β0[κirr + κizz − Li]
This objective function is linear in β0 so we have a corner solution. The feasibility
constraint (??) on β0 means that the entrepreneur’s payoff is maximized when β0 = 0
because [κirr + κ
i
zz − Li] is positive for each of the three cases of i, as can easily be
verified by consultation with Table 1. Consequently, from ?? and ??, when β0 = 0
we have that Px =
K
θ
(which does not violate ??) and that yx = −(1− θ)
θ
y0(1− κir).
Returning now to the renegotiation constraint ??, it can be rewritten as
Px + yx < β0[κ
i
rr + κ
i
zS
Ez − giE]
which, after subtituting in the solutions β0 = 0, Px =
K
θ
and yx = −(1− θ)
θ
y0(1−κir),
gives
K
θ
− (1− θ)
θ
y0(1 − κir) < 0. For the two cases of i = A and AH, y0 = 0 and
this provides the required contradiction. For the case of i = H we have that ??
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Proof of Corollary 1 From the proof of part (v) of proposition 1 it can be seen
that the solution to the relaxed maximization problem shown in that proof, namely β0 =
0, cannot therefore (because it led to a contradiction) be the solution to the complete
maximization problem (F(i)), which therefore must have an optimal β0 strictly greater
than zero.
Proof of Proposition 2 (Contractual Inefficiency) Using the results of propo-
sition 1 the optimization problem (F(i)) can be reformulated (as in the proof of part (v) of
proposition ??) as choosing over [Px, β0, yx, y0] to maximize
θ[x− Px + r − yx + SEz] (B.9)
+ (1− θ)[−y0(1− κir) + (1− β0κir)r + (1− β0κiz)SEz]
subject to:
θPx + (1− θ)β0Li −K = 0 (B.10)
θ[yx + (1− SE)z] + (1− θ)[y0(1− κir) + (1− β0κiz)(1− SE)z]− (1− SE)z = 0 (B.11)
x− Px + r − yx + SEz = x− y0(1− κir) + (1− β0κir)r + (1− β0κiz)SEz + β0giE (B.12)
Px ≤ x (B.13)
0 ≤ y0 ≤ r and 0 ≤ yx ≤ x+ r − Px (B.14)
0 ≤ β0 ≤ 1 (B.15)
We prove each part of the proof in turn.
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(i) Now both ?? and ?? can be rewritten as linear functions of β0 as follows
Px =
1
θ
K − (1− θ)
θ
β0L
i
yx =
1
θ
{(1− SE)z(1− θ)− (1− θ)[y0(1− κir) + (1− β0κiz)(1− SE)z]}
Substituting ?? and ?? into ?? gives (after manipulation) the entrepreneur’s expected
payoff from the contract
θx−K + (r + SEz)− (1− θ)β0[κirr + κizz − Li]
where the first three terms are the net present value of the project in the first best
case of no liquidation, while the last term is the expected efficiency loss from the
incompleteness of the contract, labelled ELi in the proposition. This completes the
proof of part (i) of the proposition.
(ii) The renegotiation constraint (??) can also be rewritten as a linear function of β0 to
give
Px = y0(1− κir)− yx + β0[κirr + κizSEz − giE]
Substituting () and () into () gives (after manipulation) the following reformulated
renegotiation constraint
β0 =
K − y0(1− κir)
θ[κirr + κ
i
zS
Ez − giE] + (1− θ)[Li − κiz(1− SE)z]
The new linear program is to choose β0 and y0 to maximise ?? subject to ?? and ??.
There are two cases. In the first case, when i = AH or A, κir = 1 and so the program
is equivalent to choosing the minimum β0 compatible with ?? and ??. In the second
case when i = H, κir = 0 and so any positive y0 is a possible solution. The y0 which
minimises β0 is y0 = r (the maximum possible y0 in its range). In either case ?? is
the solution provided that it falls between zero and one, which proves part (ii) of the
proposition.
Proof of Proposition 3 (Risk Profile)
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(i) θ¯ is obtained via manipulation of the denominator of ?? (setting it equal to zero
and gathering θ terms on the LHS). Since ?? must be positive, the sign of the
denominator will depend on the sign on the numerator. This gives the two cases, (a)
and (b) mentioned in the proposition.
(ii) We examine each case in turn.
(a) Case SE: Taking the derivative we have that
∂θ¯
∂SE
=
−1
1− λ− τE(1− 2λ)
which is everywhere negative by the fact that the denominator of θ¯ is posi-
tive. Hence θ¯ is decreasing in SE.
Case λ: The derivative gives (after manipulation of the numerator)
∂θ¯
∂λ
=
τE(2S
E − 1)− SE
[1− λ− τE(1− 2λ)]2
The denominator is obviously positive so that the sign depends only on the
numerator. Whether θ¯ is increasing or decreasing in λ depends on which
quadrant of the partitioned τE − SE space we are in. Set τ¯E = 12 and
τ ∗E ≡ τE2τE−1 . Then whether τE is greater than or less than τ¯E and whether
SE is greater than or less then τ ∗E determine the four quadrants of τE − SE
space depicted as follows:
τE > τ¯E τE < τ¯E
SE < τ ∗E decreasing increasing
SE > τ ∗E increasing decreasing
However, since when τE > τ¯E, then τ
∗
E (which is a hyperbola centred on
1
2
)
is always greater than one (a simple check with some numbers plugged in
verfies this), and when τE < τ¯E, then τ
∗
E is always less than zero, it follows
that the lower LHS and upper RHS quadrants are not feasible for SE which
is restricted to fall within the range [0, 1]. It follows therefore that only the
upper LHS and lower RHS quadrants are applicable and so θ¯ is decreasing
in λ.
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Case τE: The derivative gives
∂θ¯
∂τE
=
(1− SE − λ)(1− 2λ)
[1− λ− τE(1− 2λ)]2
Since by fact or assumption the other terms are positive, the sign of the
derivative depends on (1− 2λ). This gives λ = 1
2
as the cut-off and accord-
ingly gives the step function of the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 4 (Welfare)
(i) The cases of SE and τE are proved in an identical manner to the proofs of the previous
proposition (part (ii)). For the case of λ we have
∂ELH
∂λ
=
(1− θ)(K − r)(1− λ)[2τEθ + (1− θ)]− {θ[SE − τE(1− 2λ)] + (1− θ)[λ− (1− SE)]}(1− θ)(K − r)
{θ[SE − τE(1− 2λ)] + (1− θ)[λ− (1− SE)]}2
The denominator is obviously positive, so the sign of the derivative depends on the
sign of the numerator. Setting the numerator to zero gives
(1− λ)[2τEθ + (1− θ)]− {θ[SE − τE(1− 2λ)] + (1− θ)[λ− (1− SE)]} = 0
[2τEθ+(1−θ)]−λ[2τEθ+(1−θ)]−θSE+θτE−θτE2λ−(1−θ)λ+(1−θ)(1−SE) = 0
−λ{[2τEθ+(1−θ)]+θτE2+(1−θ)}−θSE+θτE+(1−θ)(1−SE)− [2τEθ+(1−θ)] = 0
λ =
−θSE + θτE + (1− θ)(1− SE)− [2τEθ + (1− θ)]
2τEθ + (1− θ) + θτE2 + (1− θ)
λ =
−{SE(2θ + 1) + θτE}
4τEθ + 2(1− θ)
1.
Proof of Proposition 5 (Partial Liquidation) Partial foreclosure is preferred to
total foreclosure when both ELA < ELAH and ELH < ELAH . The proof invovles three
steps. We consider first the case of ELA < ELAH , then the case of ELH < ELAH , and
finally we compare the two.
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Step 1: ELA < ELAH In this case we wish to show (using equations ?? and ??)
(1− θ)K(1− α)r
θr[1− τE(1− 2α)] + (1− θ)rα
<
(1− θ){K + (1− SE)z[1− φ(λ)]}[r + SEz + φ(λ)(1− SE)z − (αr + λz)]
θ[r + SEz − τE(r + z − 2(αr + λz))] + (1− θ)[αr + λz − φ(λ)(1− SE)z]
Focusing on the denominator of the RHS, we have
θ[r + SEz − τE(r + z − 2(αr + λz))] + (1− θ)[αr + λz − φ(λ)(1− SE)z] = 0
θ{[r+SEz−τE(r+z−2(αr+λz))]−[αr+λz−φ(λ)(1−SE)z]} = −[αr+λz−φ(λ)(1−SE)z]
θ =
−[αr + λz − φ(λ)(1− SE)z]
[r + SEz − τE(r + z − 2(αr + λz))]− [αr + λz − φ(λ)(1− SE)z]
The RHS of (??) can be rearranged as follows (after much manipulation)
(1− θ)K(1− α)r + (1− θ)K[SEz + φ(λ)(1− SE)z − λz] + (1− θ)(1− SE)z[1− φ(λ)][r + SEz + φ(λ)(1− SE)z − (αr + λz)]
θr[1− τE(1− 2α)] + (1− θ)rα + θ[SEz − τE(1− 2λ)z] + (1− θ)[λz − φ(λ)(1− SE)z]
If for notational convenience we denote the numerator of the LHS of (??) by Σ0 and
the denominator of the LHS by Σ0, then (??) can be written as
Σ0 + (1− θ)K[SEz + φ(λ)(1− SE)z − λz] + (1− θ)(1− SE)z[1− φ(λ)][r + SEz + φ(λ)(1− SE)z − (αr + λz)]
Σ0 + θ[SEz − τE(1− 2λ)z] + (1− θ)[λz − φ(λ)(1− SE)z]
Inequality (??) can now be written as (substituting (??) into the RHS)
Σ0
Σ0
<
Σ0 + (1− θ)K[SEz + φ(λ)(1− SE)z − λz] + (1− θ)(1− SE)z[1− φ(λ)][r + SEz + φ(λ)(1− SE)z − (αr + λz)]
Σ0 + θ[SEz − τE(1− 2λ)z] + (1− θ)[λz − φ(λ)(1− SE)z]
Again for notational convenience define X ≡ [SEz+φ(λ)(1−SE)z−λz], Y ≡ r−αr
and Z ≡ [r+SEz+φ(λ)(1−SE)z− (αr+λz)]. Note that Z = Y +X. We know that
X, Y and Z are all positive. [more on this] Also define A ≡ (1−SE)z[1−φ(λ)] which
we know is negative for all λ > 0. Finally, define Φ ≡ (1− θ)KX + (1− θ)A(X + Y )
and Ψ ≡ θ[SEz− τE(1− 2λ)z] + (1− θ)[λz−φ(λ)(1−SE)z]. Then ?? can be written
more simply as
Σ0
Σ0
<
Σ0 + Φ
Σ0 +Ψ
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where Φ ≡ (1− θ)KX + (1− θ)A(X + Y ). There are 2 cases in which the inequality
can hold.26
Case 1: (Σ0 +Ψ > 0) In this case the inequality holds if and only if Σ
0Ψ < ΦΣ0.
This means that
[(1− θ)K(1− α)r]θ[SEz − τE(1− 2λ)z] + (1− θ)[λz − φ(λ)(1− SE)z]
< θ[SEz − τE(1− 2λ)z] + (1− θ)[λz − φ(λ)(1− SE)z][θr[1− τE(1− 2α)] + (1− θ)rα]
[(1− θ)K(1− α)r]θ[SEz − τE(1− 2λ)z]− θ[SEz − τE(1− 2λ)z]
+(1− θ)[λz − φ(λ)(1− SE)z]
−(1− θ)[λz − φ(λ)(1− SE)z][θr[1− τE(1− 2α)] + (1− θ)rα] < 0
[SEz − τE(1− 2λ)z]{θ(1− θ)K(1− α)r − θ}
+[λz − φ(λ)(1− SE)z]{(1− θ)− (1− θ)θr[1− τE(1− 2α)]− (1− θ)rα + (1− θ)θrα} < 0
[SEz − τE(1− 2λ)z]{θ[K(1− α)r − 1]− θ2K(1− α)r}
+[λz − φ(λ)(1− SE)z]{1− θ − (1− θ)θr + (1− θ)θrτE(1− 2α)− rα + 2θrα− θ2rα} < 0
Now (1 − λ) is always strictly positive. Consequently, showing that the inequality
holds depends on the sign and/or magnitude of (1− θ)λ− θτ(1−λ). If it is zero
or negative then the inequality holds immediately. This is true if
θ ≥ 1
1 + τ
(
1
λ
− 1
) (B.16)
If it is positive then the inequality only holds if the numerator is greater than the
denominator, or
(1− λ)− [(1− θ)λ− θτ(1− λ)] > 0
26To see this, note that, as a matter of simple algebra,
a
b
<
a+ c
b+ d
can be rearranged as (provided
b+ d > 0) a(b+ d) < (a+ c)b which reduces to ad < cb, and can also be rearranged as (provided b+ d < 0)
ad > cb.
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which implies
θ >
1−
(
1
λ
− 1
)
1 + τ
(
1
λ
− 1
) ≡ θˆ (B.17)
where the last equivalence follows from definition ?? in section 3. Since λ by definition
is never strictly one, it follows that the RHS of (B.17) is always strictly less than the RHS
of (??). Going through analagous steps will show that ELB < ELAB whenever
θ >
1−
(
1
α
− 1
)
1 + τ
(
1
α
− 1
)
Hence the final part of the proof involves showing that the cut-off θ when asset A is
foreclosed is less than the cut-off θ when asset B is foreclosed. We know that c′(x) < 0.
Since θ′(c) = − (1 + τ)
[1 + τc]2
< 0, then the fact that θˆ is the cut-off point follows immediately
from assumption ??.
Proof of Proposition ?? (Guarantee Conditions) Define ψ ≡ ELA − ELH .
The entrepreneur is indifferent between using the project asset or the relationship asset for
foreclosure when ψ = 0. That is (from (??) and (??) in section 3)
ψ ≡ K[r − αr]
θ[r − τE(r − 2αr)] + (1− θ)αr (1− θ)
− {K + (1− S
E)z[1− φ(λ)]− r}[SEz + φ(λ)(1− SE)z − λz]
θ[SEz − τE(z − 2λz)] + (1− θ)[λz − φ(λ)(1− SE)z] (1− θ) = 0
This implies that
K[r − αr]{θ[SEz − τE(z − 2λz)] + (1− θ)[λz − φ(λ)(1− SE)z]}
−{K+(1−SE)z[1−φ(λ)]−r}[SEz+φ(λ)(1−SE)z−λz][θ[r−τE(r−2αr)]+(1−θ)αr] = 0
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which can be written as (gathering θ terms)
θ{K[r − αr]{SEz − (λz − φ(λ)(1− SE)z)− τE(z − 2λz)}
− {[r − τE(r − 2αr)]− αr}{K + (1− SE)z[1− φ(λ)]− r}[SEz − (λz − φ(λ)(1− SE)z)]}
−αr{K+(1−SE)z[1−φ(λ)]−r}[SEz−(λz−φ(λ)(1−SE)z)]+K[r−αr][λz−φ(λ)(1−SE)z] = 0
To avoid notational overload we make the following definition.
Definition 1 Θ ≡ λz − φ(λ)(1− SE)z, Λ ≡ K + (1− SE)z[1− φ(λ)]− r and Ω ≡ r − αr
and Ξ ≡ z − λz.
The assumptions of section ?? mean that Θ and Λ are negative. Of course Ω and Ξ are
both positive. Then using definition ??, ? can be written more simply as
θ{KΩ[SEz −Θ− τE(1− 2λ)z]− [Ω− τE(1− 2α)r]Λ(SEz −Θ)}
− αrΛ(SEz −Θ) +KΩΘ = 0
and when φ(λ) = 1 then ?? becomes
θ{ΩrΞ + τE(1− 2α)rΛΞ− τE(1− 2λ)zKΩ}+KΩ[SEz − Ξ]− αrΛΞ = 0 (B.18)
Proof
(i) Investment Risk From (??) it can be seen that the entrepreneur is indifferent between
foreclosing on the project or relationship asset when
θ =
αrΛ(SEz −Θ)−KΩΘ
KΩ[SEz −Θ− τE(1− 2λ)z]− [Ω− τE(1− 2α)r]Λ(SEz −Θ) ≡ θ˜(α, λ, τE, S
E, r, z)
provided that θ˜(α, λ, τE, S
E, r, z) ∈ [0, 1]. [existence?] Taking the derivative of ψ with
respect to θ we get
dψ
dθ
= {KΩ[SEz −Θ− τE(1− 2λ)z]− [Ω− τE(1− 2α)r]Λ(SEz −Θ)} > 0
so that ψ is increasing in θ for all values of θ. It follows that the entrepreneur forecloses
on the project asset when θ < θ˜ and forecloses on the relationship asset when θ > θ˜.
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(ii) Entrepreneur Bargaining Power From (??) it can be seen that the entrepreneur
is indifferent between foreclosing on the project or relationship asset when
τE =
(SEz −Θ){θΩ(Λ−K) + αrΛ} −KΩΘ
θ(1− 2α)rΛ(SEz −Θ)− θKΩ(1− 2λ)z ≡ τ˜E(α, λ, θ, S
E, r, z)
provided that τ˜E(α, λ, θ, S
E, r, z) ∈ [1
2
, 1]. [existence?] Taking the derivative of ψ
with respect to τE we get
dψ
dτE
= θ[(1− 2α)rΛ(SEz −Θ)−KΩ(1− 2λ)z] < 0
so that ψ is decreasing in τE for all values of τE. It follows that the entrepreneur
forecloses on the relationship asset when τE < τ˜E and forecloses on the project asset
when τE > τ˜E.
(iii) Entrepreneur Relationship Asset Share From (??) it can be seen that the en-
trepreneur is indifferent between foreclosing on the project or relationship asset when
SE =
1
KΩz
{KΩΞ + αrΛΞ− θ[ΩrΞ + τE(1− 2α)rΛΞ− τE(1− 2λ)zKΩ]} ≡ S˜E(α, λ, θ, τE, r, z)
provided that S˜E(α, λ, θ, τE, r, z) ∈ [0, 12 ]. [existence?] Taking the derivative of ψ in
(??) with respect to SE we get
dψ
dSE
= KΩz > 0
so that ψ is increasing in SE for all values of SE. It follows that the entrepreneur
forecloses on the project asset when SE < S˜E and forecloses on the relationship asset
when SE > S˜E.
(iv) Relative Inefficiency
(a) From (??) it can be seen that the entrepreneur is indifferent between foreclosing
on the project or relationship asset when
λ =
[θΩ + θτE(1− 2α)Λ−K(1− α)− αΛ] +K(1− α)[SE − θτE]
[θΩ + θτE(1− 2α)Λ−K(1− α)− αΛ] + θτE2K(1− α) ≡ λ˜(α, S
E, θ, τE, r, z)
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provided that λ˜ ∈ [0, 1
2
). [existence?] Taking the derivative of ψ with respect to
λ we get
dψ
dλ
= r[1− τE]θ + [3θτE − 1]K + α[(1− θ + 2θτE)r − 4θτEK] > 0
so that ψ is increasing in λ for all values of λ. It follows that the entrepreneur
forecloses on the project asset when λ < λ˜ and forecloses on the relationship
asset when λ > λ˜.
(b) From (??) it can be seen that the entrepreneur is indifferent between foreclosing
on the project or relationship asset when
α =?? ≡ α˜(λ, SE, θ, τE, r, z)
provided that α˜ ∈ [0, 1
2
). [existence?] Taking the derivative of ψ with respect to
α we get
dψ
dα
=?? >??
so that ψ is increasing in α for all values of α. It follows that the entrepreneur
forecloses on the relationship asset when α < α˜ and forecloses on the project
asset when α > α˜.
Proof of Proposition ?? (Asset Share, Coercion and Project Risk Reversal)
[Need to rewrite this] Equation (??) implies
θ =
rzΛ
ρ∇− rzλ[1− ακ(τ, c)] ≡ θ˜ (B.19)
Taking the derivate of ψ with respect to θ we get
dψ
dθ
= ρ∇− rzλ[1− ακ(τ, c)]
which (since ∇ < 0 by assumption) is positive or negative depending solely on the magni-
tude of κ. When κ = 0 so that there is no coercion,
dψ
dθ
< 0, which implies that for θ > θˆ
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the entrepreneur forecloses on the project asset (asset A) and for θ < θˆ the entrepreneur
forecloses on the relationship asset (asset B). However
d2ψ
dκdθ
= rzλα ≥ 0
implying that when coercion is large enough,
dψ
dθ
> 0, implying that the situation reverses
where for θ > θˆ the entrepreneur forecloses on the relationship asset (asset B) and for θ < θˆ
the entrepreneur forecloses on the project asset (asset A). The turning point occurs where
κ(τ, λ) =
rzλ− ρ∇
αrzλ
≡ κ∗ (B.20)
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